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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This matter involves the final decision and order of the Industrial Commission denying a 
petition for Workers' Compensation benefits. As a result, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issues raised in this appeal arose out of the Industrial Commission's (hereinafter 
"Commission" or "Industrial Commission") denial of Workers' Compensation benefits, 
particularly those related to a permanent and total disability of the petitioner Robert Smith 
(hereinafter "Mr. Smith" or "Applicant"). The Industrial Commission's action was precipitated 
by a hearing before an administrative law judge (R.182), as well as briefing to the Industrial 
Commission (R. 105-128). Both the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Administrative 
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission Order are attached as Addenda One and Two. 
Petitioner's petition for review is attached as Addendum Three. Accordingly, this issue has been 
preserved for appeal. 
Issue Presented: Whether Robert Smith failed to make out a prima facie case of 
permanent total disability, including a showing of medical causation. 
Standard of Review: The Industrial Commission's findings of fact regarding medical 
causation will be sustained only if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record. Willardson v. Industrial Comm.. 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd 
on other grounds, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). 
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Issue for Review: Whether the Industrial Commission should have used the sequential 
decision-making analysis of the Social Security Administration in its determination of the 
issues. 
Standard of Review: Conclusions of the Commission as to general questions of law, 
such as what law to apply, are reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference 
given to the Commission. Willardson v. Industrial Comm.. 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993).rev'd on other grounds. 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). The factors to be considered by 
administrative tribunals are questions of law. Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission. 885 
P.2d 759, 770 (Utah 1994). 
Issue for Review: Whether the Industrial Commission improperly relied upon the 
medical panel's determination of Mr. Smith's disability status. 
Standard of Review: The Commission's interpretation of the Workers' Compensation 
Act is reviewed for correctness, although the Industrial Commission has discretion to apply its 
factual findings to the law, and the Commission's application will not be disturbed unless its 
interpretation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial 
Comm.. 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The factors to be considered by administrative 
tribunals are questions of law. Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 770 (Utah 
1994). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUES, AND RULES 
This matter involves the interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act, specifically 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1992)1 and Utah Administrative Code R490-1-17, which have been 
reproduced in their entirety in Addendum Four. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual History: The present case involves an application for benefits for permanent 
total disability brought by Robert Smith arising out of an accident which occurred at the work 
site of his employer, Mity Lite. On May 23,1990, Robert Smith, in the course of his work at 
Mity Lite, was lifting pallets with the aid of a co-employee. Mr. Smith's supervisor told the co-
employee he was needed elsewhere and required Mr. Smith to continue lifting the pallets 
himself. When Mr. Smith tried to lift a heavy pallet by himself he injured his back. (R. 195). 
Following the injury, Mr. Smith was unable to work and drove himself to the hospital a few 
hours later. (R. 124). 
Mr. Smith subsequently underwent three surgeries, received spinal injections, and has 
undergone extensive physical therapy to alleviate the pain in his lower back. (R. 195). Mr. 
Smith is 45 years old and prior to May 23,1990, Mr. Smith had never before been treated by a 
health care professional for back problems. (R. 224). 
Notwithstanding Mr. Smith's medical treatments, he has been unable to alleviate the 
significant pain since the accident and finds it necessary to treat his pain with morphine every 
*A11 citations to the Utah Code are those provisions which were in effect at the time of the 
initial injury. In Workers' Compensation cases the law existing at the time of injury is applied. 
Wicat Systems v. Pellegrini. 771 P.2d 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moore v. American Coal Co.. 
737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987). 
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few hours. (R. 196). Mr. Smith is unable to sit for any substantial period of time. When he is 
required to travel, he must lie down in the back of his van and be driven to his destination. (R. 
197). 
Mr. Smith is also severely restricted in his ability to walk. He is able to walk across the 
room, but he cannot walk around the block. (R. 198). At the time of his hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge on May 16,1994, Mr. Smith stated that the level of pain which makes 
it impossible to sit and walk a substantial distance has persisted for several years. (R. 199). 
Mr. Smith's lifetime work experience has been limited to general labor, e.g. heavy lifting, 
digging ditches, and stacking heavy materials. He has no formal education past the fifth grade.2 
(R. 200). He cannot read a newspaper and is unable to complete an employment application 
without the help of his wife. Mr. Smith's mathematical skills are so limited that he is unable to 
balance a checkbook. (R. 201). 
Since Mr. Smith's accident at Mity Lite he has not been employed. (R. 201). Social 
Security Disability benefits were granted by the Social Security Administration as of the date of 
his accident based on a finding that he has been unable to work due to a herniated disc with 
peridural adhesions. (R. 55). 
Procedural History: Mr. Smith made a claim with the Industrial Commission for 
permanent total disability. As part of the claims process, the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
appointed a medical panel to consider Mr. Smith's claims. The medical panel found that Mr. 
Smith suffers from a 13% permanent impairment to his low back, two-thirds of which is 
2Mity Lite contended at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge that Mr. Smith 
may have gone as far as the seventh grade. 
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attributable to the industrial accident. He also suffers from a seven percent impairment due to a 
pre-existing shoulder injury, and a five percent impairment due to his psychiatric status. (R. 75). 
However, the medical panel found that the shoulder impairment had no effect on Mr. Smith's 
ability to work. (R. 75). 
Based on these findings, the ALJ found adequate medical causation to grant Robert Smith 
temporary total disability benefits for the period of May 23,1990 through October 1,1992, but 
denied Mr. Smith's claim for permanent total disability benefits because of insufficient evidence 
of medical causation. (R. 102). The Industrial Commission (Commission) adopted the findings 
of the medical panel and the Administrative Law Judge and denied Mr. Smith's application for 
benefits, with the exception of Commissioner Carlson who dissented. (R. 126). 
Commissioner Carlson dissented on the basis that there was no dispute that Mr. Smith 
had suffered an industrial accident which was the medical cause of his three subsequent surgeries 
and unmanageable pain. Further, Commissioner Carlson stated that Mr. Smith's age, education, 
and level of pain make it impossible him to perform the few unskilled light duty jobs he is 
theoretically qualified to perform. Commissioner Carlson stated: 
In my view, Mr. Smith's injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him 
permanently and totally disabled. This opinion is supported by the fact the Mr. Smith has 
been awarded Social Security Disability benefits for essentially the same injuries that are 
at issue in his Workers' Compensation case. 
(R. 127). A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the applicant followed, which motion was 
expressly denied for the reasons stated in the original Commission Order. (R. 146). Mr. Smith 
now appeals the decision of the Industrial Commission denying him permanent total disability 
compensation. 
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EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION 
(MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE) 
The Commission's denial of permanent total disability rested upon a finding of no 
medical causation. After adopting the medical panel's report, the Commission stated:3 
In considering the issue of medical causation, the Industrial Commission notes 
that the medical panel has found Mr. Smith to suffer from a 13% whole person 
impairment of his lower back, of which two-thirds is due to his industrial injury. The 
foregoing impairment is not inconsequential. However, the medical panel and other 
physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent pattern of non-industrial 
depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependancy, personality disorder and 
depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to return to work. For 
example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial and nonindustrial impairments, 
the medical panel concluded that with adequate conditioning, Mr. Smith can perform 
light duty work. As noted at page five of the ALJ's decision, "Mr. Smith has 
demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies. A large portion of his 
disability is not caused by objective factors. He has a pattern of exaggerated physical 
complaints." 
Having considered the medical and other evidence regarding the relationship 
between Mr. Smith's industrial accident and his now claimed permanent total disability, 
the Industrial Commission concludes that Mr. Smith has failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his industrial accident is the medical cause of his now 
claimed permanent total disability. 
(R. 125-26). In support for this conclusion of law which is actually a finding of fact applicant 
has marshaled the following evidence.4 
3Although the Administrative Law Judge initially heard the evidence in this matter, as the 
Commission is the ultimate fact finder, the applicant is attacking solely the Commission's 
findings. Hoskings. Industrial Comm.. 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct App. 1996). Of course, the 
Commission relied to a large extent on the facts as found by the Administrative Law Judge, and 
so the findings by the judge must be considered in evaluating the Commission's conclusions. 
4Applicant assumes that the Industrial Commission do not consider Mr. Smith's 
asymptomatic back condition in its determination both because the preexisting spinal disc 
degeneration is not mentioned in the aforementioned conclusion and also because such 
consideration would be contrary to law. Crossland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528 (Utah Ct. 
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The findings of non-industrial depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency 
and personality disorder are mainly conclusions arrived at by the medical panel based upon the 
conclusions of Dr. David O. McCann, a psychiatrist. See Dr. McCann's Conclusions R. 448-51. 
Mr. Smith was also diagnosed as being depressed by Dr. Robert Burgoyne. (R. 79). The medical 
panel must have based its conclusions as to lower back impairment on the opinion of other 
physicians because the medical panel did not consider its measurements of Mr. Smith's 
lumbosacral spine to be valid due to Mr. Smith's expressions of pain. (R. 73). Dr. Nathaniel 
Nord, who conducted an independent medical examination at the behest of the Fund, wrote that 
as of January 1994 Mr. Smith relied upon the use of a walker "which appeared not be [sic] 
required by any evident gait abnormality." (R. 245). In April of 1993, Dr. Nord wrote that his 
examination "revealed a middle-aged man with marked mannerisms of pain behavior. While a 
walker was pushed ahead of him, weight bearing on the unit was minimal, and Mr. Smith 
appeared to walk freely, without antalgic pattern." (R. 250). Dr. Nord noted further, "Although 
Mr. Smith cautiously lowered himself to the examination table, when he subsequently was asked 
to arise from the table he did not use a logrolling technique, but merely pushed himself 
upwards." (R. 250-51). 
All medical providers concur that Mr. Smith suffered from pre-existing degenerative disc 
disease to his back, although there is no evidence whatsoever of that condition being 
App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)("Utah Courts have followed the well established 
common law rule that when an industrial accident lights up or aggravates a pre-existing 
deficiency or disease, the resulting disability is compensable as long as the industrial accident 
was the medical and legal cause of the injury."). 
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symptomatic in any way. The diagnostic imaging studies done of Mr. Smith did show the 
degenerative disc disease. (R. 422-428). Only Dr. McCann made a definitive finding as to 
opiate dependancy, although Dr. Nord referred Mr. Smith for "psychologic assistance and 
withdrawal from the addictive properties of morphine sulfate." (R. 247). Dr. McCann also 
identifies as the genesis of his finding of somatoform pain disorder the suggestion of Dr. College 
at the Cottonwood Spine Institute of similar findings. (R. 449). The applicant was unable to find 
any physician other than David McCann who diagnosed Mr. Smith with personality disorder. 
As to Mr. Smith's inability to work, Dr. Nord did state: 
[T]he evident physical impairment does not prevent Mr. Smith from returning to any kind 
of competitive employment. 
(R.247). However, this statement was qualified in a subsequent letter wherein Dr. Nord stated: 
"[W]e would judge Mr. Smith to have a light work capacity." (R. 248). The forgoing constitutes 
the evidence marshaled in favor of the Industrial Commission's determination that medical 
causation was not shown. 
In contrast, the following evidence supports a finding that Mr. Smith's industrial accident 
medically caused Mr. Smith's significant permanent impairment to his lower back which 
precludes him from returning to his prior employment of manual labor which included heavy 
lifting, standing, twisting, etc. All of Mr. Smith's treating physicians, as well as the independent 
medical examiner Dr. Nord, concluded that Mr. Smith is permanently impaired. For example, 
Dr. Nord found that Mr. Smith suffers from a 14% lumbar permanent impairment, only two 
percent of which is attributable to pre-existing back degeneration. Dr. Nord notes: 
The percentage of impairment attributable to the industrial injury of May 23,1991 is 12% 
of the whole person. 
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(R. 246). Dr. Nord concluded that Mr. Smith's permanent impairment attributable to events 
subsequent to the industrial injury is zero percent. Dr. Nord specifically noted: 
The medical care received since May 23,1990 was necessitated by the industrial accident 
of that date. 
This medical care presumably would include the prescription of opiate drugs which the medical 
panel now finds to be a component of Mr. Smith's disability. Dr. Nord wrote: "Should it be 
possible for Mr. Smith to return to the work force, the standard restrictions regarding repetitive 
lifting, bending, and carrying, particularly of objects weighing in excess of 25 pound, would 
apply." (R. 252). Dr. Nord had previously stated that future work "must preclude activities of 
lifting greater than 35 pounds, repetitive stooping, bending, or twisting." (R. 260). 
Prior to the industrial accident at issue, Mr. Smith had not suffered a work related injury. 
(R. 223). Mr. Smith had never received medical treatment for a back condition prior to the 
industrial accident at Mity-Lite. In fact Mr. Smith has never been to a doctor or chiropractor for 
any type of back injury. (R. 224). 
Dr. Adams, Mr. Smith's main treating physician, and the physician who performed the 
surgeries on Mr. Smith, indicated that he would consider Mr. Smith to be 100% disabled. (R. 
268). Dr. Adams performed three surgeries on Mr. Smith's back, and because of persistent pain, 
prescribed the opiates to which Mr. Smith may now be addicted. As stated, there is no evidence 
that Mr. Smith took opiates or drugs of any kind prior to his industrial accident. While all other 
physicians examined Mr. Smith or viewed radiological images, Dr. Adams actually viewed the 
area affected during surgery. In August of 1992 Dr. Adams reported: 
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The bony prominences of S1.L5 and L4 were identified and dissected free of old 
adhesions. The dura was found to be densely covered with at least 1/4 to lA inch of scar 
tissue 
(R. 355). 
Dr. Adams states in a later report: 
I . . . feel that the symptomatology was compatible with the findings. Epidural fibrosis 
was the expected sequela following lumbar disc surgery. His scarring is excessive over 
the normal amount. The patients present symptoms are completely compatible with the 
current spinal imaging films. I do not believe Mr. Smith's behavior is extreme or out of 
proportion to his pain and that the symptoms for the development of epidural fibrosis are 
exactly compatible with his present complaint. 
(R. 267). Dr. Adams then concluded: 
Mr. Smith's problem is not medically stable but demonstrate[s] evidence of a constant 
progressive deterioration. There has been a very serious emotional disability produced by 
his constant pain. The estimation of his physical rating of 11% is completely out of line 
and I feel strongly that Mr. Smith should be considered 100% permanently disabled. 
It is not possible for Mr. Smith to return to any type of work whether sitting, standing [, 
or] repetitive [actions]. There can be no climbing or lifting. The problem is that pain is 
constantly distracting and the patient requires significant narcotics. This occasionally 
obtunds his coordination and mental sensibility making him unfit for any type of 
employment. 
(R. 25). Because of the intense pain, Mr. Smith was placed on Morphine Sulfate in January of 
1993 by Dr. Adams. (R. 27). 
As stated, Mr. Smith is currently receiving Social Security disability benefits granted 
upon the basis that Mr. Smith's sole disabling medical problem is a herniated disc with peridural 
adhesions, as a result of the industrial accident of May 23,1990. (See Disability Determination 
and Transmittal, R. 55). Radiologic studies confirmed "Epidural fibrosis at the L4-5 level which 
could result in traction on the right 1-5 nerve root," as well as spondylosis, and a mild central disc 
bulge at the L5-S1 level. (R. 95). Dr. Charles Smith who also saw Mr. Smith indicated that his 
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back problems are directly related to the industrial accident. (R. 306). In December of 1990 Dr. 
Charles Smith stated: 
[Mr. Smith] is off work at present. He will be off a fairly extended period of time, until 
additional appropriate improvement can be achieved. At the present time he does not 
appear to need surgical intervention, but may in the future. 
(R. 300). 
Five different diagnostic imaging procedures indicated a herniated disc and scarring 
attributable to surgery arising out of the industrial accident. (R. 422,423,425,426, and 427). 
Even Dr. McCann who diagnosed Mr. Smith with depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate 
dependancy, and personality disorder indicated that Mr. Smith needs lifting restrictions and 
should not have jobs with repetitive motion. (R. 451). The medical panel found: 
The physical limitations which limit [Mr. Smith's] work are currently quite severe, at 
least partly based on psychological effects. 
(R. 76). The medical panel stated that Mr. Smith would need future medical care related to the 
injury of May 23, 1990. (R. 75). The medical panel also found that Mr. Smith "has a severe 
educational background which will limit the scope of his efforts [with vocational rehabilitation]." 
(R. 76). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When the Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment had been 
incurred as a result of the industrial accident at issue and that Mr. Smith could not return to his 
prior employment of heavy lifting due to that impairment, medical causation had been proved. 
Accordingly, the determination of the Industrial Commission as to medical causation must be 
reversed. 
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The Industrial Commission's finding of no medical causation rested upon a misreading of 
the medical panel's evaluation of the medical aspects of this case, wrongful deferment of the 
issues of disability and rehabilitation to the medical panel, and a misunderstanding of the law. 
The Industrial Commission reached its conclusion in spite of the fact that the medical panel 
specifically found that Mr. Smith's permanent physical impairment was related to the industrial 
accident at issue. The Industrial Commission was confused and distracted because of the 
medical panel's conclusions as to disability and possible rehabilitation. The commission's 
confusion was compounded by a misunderstanding of the law. 
Neither the medical panel nor the Industrial Commission are entitled under the Act to 
make a determination as to vocational rehabilitation. That determination must be made by the 
Department of Rehabilitation Services. Likewise, the Industrial Commission, as well as the ALJ 
below, should not have deferred their decision regarding disability to the medical panel. A 
decision as to disability must be made by the Industrial Commission. 
In order to determine whether a person is disabled, the totality of the circumstances must 
be reviewed and the Commission must apply the sequential decision-making analysis as required 
by statute.5 The Industrial Commission's erroneous conclusion rests primarily upon a 
misunderstanding of the applicable law. A prima facie case of permanent total disability does 
not require a showing that the disability is wholly medically caused by a compensable injury, 
only that a cause and effect relationship between the injury suffered and the inability to work 
5The sequential decision-making analysis is found at Utah Administrative Code R490-1-
17(D), reproduced in addendum four of applicant's brief, and provides an analysis using specific 
considerations the Commission must rely upon and be guided by in making a tentative finding of 
permanent total disability. 
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exists. There is actually no dispute in this matter that a great portion of Mr. Smith's physical 
impairment is due to the industrial accident. However, the Industrial Commission erroneously 
concluded that since there are other reasons which may contribute to Mr. Smith's inability to 
work, he should be denied permanent total disability benefits. Such a determination wholly 
disregards the sequential decision-making analysis required by statute and the odd lot doctrine as 
established by Utah appellate courts. 
In its order, the Industrial Commission cites decisions in support of a finding of no 
medical causation. However, when the facts of this case are compared with decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court, specifically Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mgt. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) 
and Marshall v. Industrial Comm.. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984), this court must conclude that 
medical causation was shown and the matter should be remanded because Mr. Smith's claim was 
prematurely terminated. 
Permanent impairment alone has never been the sole criterion of permanent disability. In 
this case, the Industrial Commission has erred as its conclusions are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Particularly, the Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon the medical panel. 
The medical panel is restricted in its review of this matter to "medical aspects". By deferring to 
the medical panel upon the issues of permanent disability as well as possible rehabilitation, the 
Industrial Commission erred. 
Lastly, the Industrial Commission improperly considered Mr. Smith's pre-existing 
condition in its determination as to medical causation. The Commission adopted the medical 
panel's finding that Mr. Smith suffered from a pre-existing impairment of his lower back. 
Nonetheless, the medical panel did not conclude that the pre-existing impairment was in anyway 
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disabling to Mr. Smith. Accordingly, if the industrial accident was the "last straw" which 
rendered Mr. Smith unable to work, then the whole of his disability should be attributable to the 
industrial accident. Such conclusion is mandated by Utah law, particularly this court's decision 
in Crossland v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 528 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In the final analysis, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are not supported by law. 
Where it is found that an industrial injury makes up part of a disability, the claim should go 
forward through the sequential decision-making analysis, the Department of Rehabilitation 
Services, and finally a review by the Industrial Commission to determine whether the odd lot 
doctrine is applicable. The law mandates this procedure, it was not followed, and therefore the 
Industrial Commission must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ESTABLISH A 
FURTHER FINDING OF MEDICAL CAUSATION 
When the Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment had been 
incurred by virtue of the industrial accident at issue and that Mr. Smith could not return to his 
prior employment of heavy lifting because of that impairment, medical causation had been 
established. To hold otherwise would be in direct conflict with Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
MgL, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) and Marshall v. Industrial Comm.. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
As a result of the Commission's misapplication of the law, Mr. Smith has been substantially 
prejudiced and the conclusions of the Industrial Commission must be reversed. 
In Hardman. the Industrial Commission denied benefits to a claimant who suffered a 
fractured skull when a steel beam fell and struck him on the head. Hardman. 725 P.2d at 1324. 
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Hardman was in his late 50fs, had only a sixth grade education, and had been a manual laborer 
most of his life. The claim in Hardman was submitted to a medical panel that found that the 
claimant suffered a permanent physical impairment totaling 25%, 10% of which was attributed to 
causes other than the industrial accident. JdL at 1324. 
Apparently, the Industrial Commission made the same error in Hardman that it made in 
the present claim. The Commission failed to distinguish between physical impairment and total 
disability. The court noted that the medical panel's rating of his disability reflected only his 
physical impairment. The court held: 
[The Industrial Commission] did not take into consideration the extent to which his 
physical impairment, compounded by other factors, could render him totally disabled.6 
Id. at 1325. Further the court explained: 
The Commission, by adopting the findings of the medical panel as its own, failed to carry 
out its task. It appears to have confused the percentage of impairment, a determination 
which the panel is qualified to make, with the percentage of disability, including factors 
in addition to the physical impairment, which is the Commission's duty to determine. In 
workmans compensation law, the disability is the worker's impairment of earning 
capacity. 
Id. at 1326. In reversing the Commission's findings, the court noted that the Commission had 
failed to acknowledge the odd lot doctrine which had "been repeatedly approved by this court." 
Id. In fact, the Hardman court acknowledged: 
Numerous other courts applying the odd lot doctrine have found permanent total 
disability despite a deceptively low percentage of physical impairment. 
6
" [Permanent impairment alone is never the sole or real criterion of permanent disability, 
and a denial of permanent total disability based on it alone invites reversal under well-settled 
stare decisis." Norton v. Industrial Comm.. 728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986). 
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Id. In this case, the physical impairment "is not inconsequential." (Commission Order at R. 
125). In fact, the Commission recognized that Mr. Smith can no longer perform the heavy lifting 
duties of his job. 
In reaching its decision in Hardman, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed its earlier decision 
of Marshall v. Industrial Comm., 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). In Marshall, a coal miner sustained 
a 10% permanent physical impairment as a result of an industrial accident. That same worker 
had suffered a previous physical impairment for a combined impairment of 25%. With nearly 
identical reasoning to the present claim, the Administrative Law Judge in Marshall denied 
permanent total disability, which the Industrial Commission sustained, upon the basis that the 
prime reason for the claimant's unemployment was because of his age rather than his physical 
impairment. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that in assessing whether a disability 
exists, a constellation of factors must be considered, only one of which is physical impairment. 
The other factors are age, education, training and mental capacity. Id at 211. See also 
Northwest Carrier v. Industrial Comm.. 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981). 
In holding that factors besides physical impairment must be considered in determining 
disability the Marshall court applied the odd lot doctrine, explaining: 
Under the odd lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually every jurisdiction, total 
disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known 
branch of the labor market. 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Larson, The Law of 
Workmans' Compensation §57.51 at 10-164.24 (1983)) (emphasis added). A claimant for 
workers' compensation falls into the odd lot doctrine when (1) he presents uncontroverted 
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evidence of his impairment; (2) he demonstrates his inability to perform the work required by his 
job; and (3) in the opinion of the Division of Rehabilitation Services he cannot be rehabilitated. 
The odd lot doctrine presupposes that there are other factors, such as age, education, training and 
mental capacity, which form a significant basis for the finding of a disability. Therefore, even if 
nonindustrial causes contribute to a disability, permanent total disability can still be found. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission as well as the courts must look to the totality of the 
circumstances. 
Interestingly, Commissioner Carlson in his dissent in the Industrial Commission Order 
denying Mr. Smith's motion for review recognized: 
In my view, Mr. Smith's injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him 
permanently and totally disabled. This opinion is supported by the fact that Mr. Smith 
has been awarded Social Security Disability benefits for essentially the same injuries that 
are at issue in his Workers' Compensation case. 
(R. 127). Commissioner Carlson explained that Mr. Smith's age, education, and level of pain 
make it impossible for him to perform the few unskilled light duty jobs he is theoretically 
qualified to perform. Id Without using the term, Commissioner Carlson was essentially arguing 
that the odd lot doctrine applies to this case. 
It is undisputed and uncontroverted that Mr. Smith suffered a permanent impairment from 
his industrial accident. (R. 75,125). Further, he has demonstrated his inability to perform the 
work required by his job. In fact, the Administrative Law Judge stated: "He will not be able to 
return to heavy lifting." (R. 102). Mr. Smith cannot, however, fulfill the third element of the 
odd lot doctrine because the Industrial Commission has erroneously held that medical causation 
does not exist and therefore Mr. Smith does not have the benefit of the opinion of the Division of 
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Rehabilitation Services. The Administrative Law Judge and the medical panel decided on their 
own that Mr. Smith could be rehabilitated and retrained for a new type of work. (R. 101). The 
Commission then followed this erroneous conclusion. This is clear error according to Hardman.7 
The facts of the present matter mandate a finding of medical causation. The facts also 
form a prima facie showing of permanent total disability under the sequential decision-making 
analysis and the odd lot doctrine. The marshaled evidence in support of the Commission's 
findings regarding medical causation is not substantial. To the contrary, the marshaled evidence 
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that medical causation has been shown: Five different 
diagnostic imagining procedures indicated a herniated disc and scarring arising out of the 
industrial accident, (R. 422,423,425,426, and 427); the great majority of health care providers 
who treated Mr. Smith indicated that he needed lifting restrictions and should not have jobs with 
repetitive motion; and all health care providers indicated that he had a permanent impairment to 
his back arising out of the accident. It is simply uncontroverted that Mr. Smith suffers a 
permanent impairment to his back. The only question remaining is whether that impairment 
rendered Mr. Smith not amenable to rehabilitation and therefore permanently disabled. The 
Industrial Commission simply did not address this question. It ignored the fact that Mr. Smith 
suffers from a permanent back impairment. 
It is undisputed that the petitioner in fact suffered a compensable injury, which injury is 
the subject of this appeal. It is further undisputed that the Social Security Administration has 
awarded Robert Smith disability benefits wholly related to the industrial accident at issue. 
7Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mgt.. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) (holding that 
adopting medical panel's conclusions as to disability or rehabilitation constitutes clear error). 
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Because the Commission misapplied the law, erroneously applied the facts to the law, and 
because the facts as found by the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence, Mr. 
Smith was wrongfully denied benefits. Such prejudice mandates reversal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (Supp. 1995). 
II. A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY DOES NOT 
REQUIRE A SHOWING THAT THE DISABILITY IS WHOLLY MEDICALLY 
CAUSED BY A COMPENSABLE INJURY 
By adopting the medical panel report, the Commission found (1) that Mr. Smith had 
experienced no problems with his back prior to May 23,1990, (R. 71, 74); (2) that he has a 13% 
whole person permanent impairment to his low back, two-thirds of which is attributable to the 
industrial injury and characterized by the Commission as "not inconsequential," (R. 125); and (3) 
that Mr. Smith's industrial injury to his back contributes to his current disability. (R. 74-76). 
The foregoing facts, coupled with the Commission's acknowledgment that Mr. Smith has not 
worked since his industrial accident of May 23,1990, makes it obvious the Commission found 
that Mr. Smith's pre-existing back problems had been asymptomatic, but are now significant. 
In spite of that finding, the Commission somehow concluded that no nexus exists 
between the industrial accident, the injury suffered by Mr. Smith, and his claim of disability. 
Instead, the Industrial Commission concluded: 
[T]he medical panel and other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent 
pattern of non-industrial depression, somataform pain disorder, opiate dependancy, 
personality disorder and depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to 
return to work. 
(R. 125). As a result, the Industrial Commission has rested its denial of workers' compensation 
benefits for permanent total disability on the medical panel and other physicians' "diagnosis" as 
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to Mr. Smith's inability to return to work. Additionally, the Industrial Commission accepted the 
medical panel's conclusion that with adequate conditioning Mr. Smith can perform light duty 
work. The Industrial Commission thereafter concluded: 
Because medical causation is a prerequisite of an award of benefits, the Industrial 
Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that Mr. Smith's application for permanent total 
disability compensation must be denied. 
(R. 126). This decision cannot be upheld. 
It is simply inconsistent for the Commission to conclude on the one hand that Mr. 
Smith's back problems were completely asymptomatic prior to the accident, and further find that 
a significant permanent impairment arose out of the industrial accident, and nonetheless conclude 
that medical causation is absent. Under the Allen8 analysis, medical causation is required for any 
compensable injury. The Commission's conclusion that Mr. Smith's industrial accident was the 
medical cause of his temporary total disability, but not his permanent total disability, is illogical 
and cannot be sustained. If the industrial injury was the medical cause of Mr. Smith's temporary 
total disability, and the same injury forever precludes Mr. Smith from engaging in his previous 
employment, medical causation is established. 
As the holdings in Hardman and Marshall exhibit, a prima facie case of permanent total 
disability does not require a showing that the disability is wholly medically caused by a 
compensable injury. The statutory sequential decision-making analysis as well as the odd lot 
doctrine highlight that often a disability is caused by many other factors besides physical 
impairment. Those other factors, such as age, education, training and mental capacity are often 
;AUen v. Industrial Comm.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
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not medically related to the industrial accident at all. Nonetheless, those factors are necessary in 
making a determination as to disability. Is sum, neither the facts nor the law support the 
Commission's findings and conclusions in this matter. 
III. THE COMMISSION MISUNDERSTOOD AND IGNORED THE APPLICABLE 
LAW AND IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THE MEDICAL PANEL 
A. THE CASE LAW CITED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT MATTER 
As stated, under the analysis ofHardman and Marshall Mr. Smith did prove medical 
causation. The Commission's misunderstanding and misapplication of the law most likely arose 
out of a misapprehension of the holdings of this court in Zupon v. Industrial Comm.. 860 P.2d 
960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Ortiz v. Industrial Comm.. 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and 
Large v. Industrial Comm.. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A careful review of these cases 
shows them to be significantly distinguishable from the present matter. 
Utah law has established that permanent total disability may be denied in circumstances 
where a disability is wholly attributable to injuries other than those suffered in an industrial 
accident. For example, in Zupon v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), this court was faced with the facts where an electrician felt pain in his back while lifting 
an acetylene tank at work. A medical panel found that the claimant had a total physical 
impairment of 60%. Specifically, the medical panel found that 10% of this physical impairment 
was due to the industrial accident, while the remaining 50% was due to pre-existing 
degenerative spinal disease. Two years after the industrial accident, the petitioner applied for 
Social Security benefits for total disability, which were granted, not as a result of his back 
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problems, but rather as a result of arthritis in his hands. Approximately 12 years after the 
claimant was granted social security benefits, the claimant filed an application for permanent 
total disability based upon his previous industrial accident. The court in Zupon sustained the 
Commission in denying benefits for permanent total disability on the basis that the medical 
condition, arthritic hands, which rendered the claimant unable to work was in noway related to 
his industrial accident. Id at 964. 
Accordingly, the Zupon case is distinguishable from the present matter because Mr. 
Smith is making a claim for permanent total disability based upon the same injury for which he 
received three surgeries and was awarded temporary total disability. No substantial and 
intervening period of time has elapsed since the accident, and in that short intervening period, 
Mr. Smith has not been employed in any way, but instead has continued to suffer from and be 
treated for the injuries which occurred at his workplace. 
Likewise, in the matter of Ortiz v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), an employee at Kennecott Copper Company injured his back while lifting a 
railroad tie at work. He underwent surgery to fuse several discs in his back and later returned to 
his employment. Subsequent to the industrial accident, the claimant in Ortiz was involved in two 
automobile accidents. Thereafter, the applicant filed a claim with the Industrial Commission 
based upon his previous industrial accident claiming permanent total disability. The 
Commission held, and this court affirmed, that the claimant's injuries were caused by the 
subsequent automobile accidents, not by his previous industrial accident. Obviously, the Ortiz 
decision highlights the difference between intervening or alternate causes of a disability, and 
those instances where it is undisputed that a compensable injury is at issue. Here, the record 
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shows no intervening injuries to have occurred, and the Commission itself found that Mr. Smith 
suffers from a permanent low back impairment and was temporarily totally disabled for the exact 
same injuries. 
Consistent with the Zupon and Ortiz decisions, this court in Large v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) was faced with facts where a truck 
driver while going through the application process for a job at a trucking company fell from a 
truck, allegedly injuring his back. After a long course of treatment, a CT scan of the back was 
made to determine the extent of a claimed compression fracture of the lumbar spine. The 
medical testimony found that the compression fracture "appears to be an old compression 
fracture." Based upon this finding, this court held that the fall at the place of employment was 
not shown to be the medical cause of any claimed disability. Once again, this court drew a 
distinction between an injury and the claimed disability. As to Mr. Smith's claim, however, 
there is no dispute that his disability, to a great extent, was caused directly by his industrial 
accident. See Medical Panel Report (R. 74,76). 
It is important to note that all of these cases, Zupon, Ortiz, and Large, which were cited 
by the Commission (R. 125), find their genesis in the Utah Supreme Court case of Allen v. 
Industrial Comm.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court was interpreting 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-45 (1986) which determines whether workers' compensation is 
applicable. The court in Allen explained that in order for an injury to be compensable at all, 
whether temporarily or permanently, the injury must occur "by accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment," and that that phrase required "(1) proof that the injury occurred 'by 
accident' and (2) proof of a causal connection between that accident and the activities or 
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exertions required in the workplace." Large, 758 P.2d at 956 (quoting Allen v. Industrial 
Comm.. 729 P.2d at 18). In analyzing the second requirement of a causal connection, the 
Supreme Court in Allen adopted a two part test which requires a claimant to establish both legal 
and medical causation. Thus, a correct reading of Allen highlights that the test for medical 
causation establishes whether the injury is compensable at all, not whether the resulting disability 
is caused solely by the industrial accident. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm.. 731 P.2d 
1079 (Utah 1986). 
B. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS IGNORE THE SEQUENTIAL 
DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS MANDATED BY STATUTE AS WELL AS 
THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE 
To sustain the Industrial Commission, the plain language of applicable statutes as well as 
other common law laid down by the Utah Supreme Court and accepted by this court would be 
ignored. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) provides: 
In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes 
of this chapter requires a finding by the Commission of total disability, as measured by 
the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security 
Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The 
Commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 
404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.9 
9Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 was substantially amended effective May 1,1995, and no 
longer requires an analysis made pursuant to the sequential decision-making process of the 
Social Security Administration. Although it should be noted that the new statute essentially 
requires the same analysis. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (b) and (c). In any event, the 
statute as it existed at the time of the injury must be applied. See supra note 1. 
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The Commission did in fact adopt rules that conform to the Social Security 
Administration's sequential decision-making process. Significantly, Utah Administrative Code 
R490-1-17(D) states: 
To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission shall rely upon 
and be guided by the rules of disability determination published by the Social Security 
Administration office of disability publication SSA Pub. No.64-014, as amended. In 
short, the sequential decision-making process referred to requires a series of questions 
and evaluations to be made in sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal a list of impairments in appendix one of 
SSA Pub. No. 64-014? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous work? 
Of course, the Commission did not apply R. 490-1-17(D) because it had erroneously concluded 
that such analysis was not warranted. 
If the legal conclusions of the Industrial Commission are sustained, neither the sequential 
decision-making process nor the odd lot doctrine could ever be invoked. If there are other factors 
which lead to a conclusion of disability, under the Industrial Commission's analysis, medical 
causation cannot be shown. However, the sequential decision-making process is mandated by 
statute and the odd lot doctrine is well accepted by Utah appellate decisions. 
The correct process and evaluation of Robert Smith's claim was prematurely terminated. 
As stated, the Commission erroneously concluded that to make a showing of medial causation 
sufficient for a claim of permanent total disability, the petitioner must show that his disability 
was wholly caused by the medical condition arising out of the industrial accident at issue. As 
explained hereafter, the Commission also erroneously relied on the medical panel's conclusion as 
to disability, a conclusion which the panel was not entitled to make under the law. The 
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Commission relied upon the medical panel's determination both as to disability and possible 
rehabilitation, and by virtue of such reliance, the correct procedure to be followed in this matter 
was disregarded. 
Further, the Commission erroneously considered pre-existing conditions suffered by Mr. 
Smith and further failed to apply the sequential decision-making analysis required by statute or 
the odd lot doctrine as established by Utah appellate courts. Accordingly, the present matter 
should be remanded for a determination of rehabilitative possibilities, a determination of whether 
permanent total disability benefits are applicable under the sequential analysis, and a review by 
the Commission as to the possible application of the odd lot doctrine. 
C. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON 
THE MEDICAL PANEL'S DETERMINATION OF MR. SMITH'S 
DISABILITY STATUS 
The Industrial Commission in this matter adopted the medical panel's report which 
included the "diagnosis" that: 
Much of Mr. Smith's inability to return to work stems from factors other than the results 
of the injury. 
(R. 124). In denying Mr. Smith's claim for permanent total disability, the Industrial Commission 
relied upon the medical panel's determination of the cause of Mr. Smith's inability to return to 
work. The Industrial Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law must be reversed 
because the Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon a medical panel to determine issues 
outside of the scope of the panel's authority and also because the findings of fact are not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
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The findings of the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence. The 
Industrial Commission in its order denying applicant's motion for review stated: 
[T]he medical panel and other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent 
pattern of non-industrial depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependancy, 
personality disorder and depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to 
return to work. For example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial accident and 
non-industrial impairments, the medical panel concluded that with adequate conditioning, 
Mr. Smith can perform light duty work. 
(R.125-26). Besides the fact that it is outside the scope of the medical panel's authority to 
determine the cause of the disability, or whether Mr. Smith can be rehabilitated, the findings of 
fact as stated by the Industrial Commission are not themselves supported by the medical panel's 
report. Specifically, the medical panel concluded: 
The physical limitations which limit [Mr. Smith's] work are currently quite severe, at 
least partly based on psychological effects. He should, however, be able to manage light 
duty activities, once he becomes better conditioned for this. His shoulder limitation 
should not be restrictive factor beyond limitations because of his back condition. It is 
possible the wearing of glasses would increase his capabilities. 
The job position shown in paragraph seven and eight of the preliminary findings 
of fact have been reviewed. In his current status, and probably at the time they were 
offered to him, he does not seem likely to manage those adequately with any degree of 
success. 
(R. 76). (emphasis added). Thus, at the time Mr. Smith made his claim for disability benefits, he 
was not in a condition to perform the light duty work which the Industrial Commission 
mistakenly believed that the medical panel indicated that he could do. In any event, that 
determination should have been made by the Department of Rehabilitation Services. More 
importantly, the medical panel did not diagnose as "the cause of his inability to work" factors 
other than the problems with his back. In fact, the report of the medical panel shows that the 
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shoulder limitation is not a restrictive factor at all, particularly because of his back condition, 
which it is admitted arose out of the industrial accident. (R. 75). 
In short, the Industrial Commission ignored the medical panel's report which found 
among other things that Mr. Smith has been temporarily and totally disabled for at least a period 
of six months after his third surgical intervention and that the medical care received after the 
industrial accident was related to that accident. Furthermore, Mr. Smith has a permanent 
impairment of 13% to his low back which is a major component of his total impairment. The 
Industrial Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law are simply not supported by 
substantial evidence. The Industrial Commission cited no evidence other than the medical 
panel's report for their conclusions, and as has been shown above, the Industrial Commission 
apparently did not review the panel's report accurately. 
The Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon the medical panel. Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-77(1) provides for medical panels in workers' compensation cases and provides: 
(a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death, 
arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier 
denies liability, the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the Commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally 
applicable to the medical panel under § 35-2-56. 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical 
aspects of a controverted case, the Commission in its sole discretion may employ a 
medical director or medical consultant on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of 
evaluating the medical evidence and advising the Commission with respect to its ultimate 
fact finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or a 
medical consultant, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and under the 
same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(emphasis added). As the statue specifically provides, the scope of review by the medical panel 
is limited to "medical aspects." The statute in no wise provides a basis for the medical panel to 
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make any determination as to actual disability or rehabilitation. The Commission's reliance 
upon the medical panel's determination of Mr. Smith's disability status and possible 
rehabilitation is clearly error. 
In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt.. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986), a claimant applied 
for permanent total disability benefits for an industrial injury. A medical panel was appointed 
and asked to asses the extent of the claimant's disability and determine whether there was a 
causal connection between the injury he sustained and the disability claimed. Just as in the 
present case, the panel found that the claimant had been temporarily totally disabled and suffered 
from permanent impairment. The claimant was found to have a permanent impairment of 25%, 
only 15% of which was directly attributable to the accident. In reviewing Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-67, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that the act itself does not set forth the often 
"unquantifiable factors that establish a permanent total disability, even on a tentative basis." Id 
at 1325. In criticizing the medical panel's conclusions, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The panel's rating of his disability, however, reflected only his physical impairment. It 
did not take into consideration the extent to which his physical impairment, compounded 
by other factors, could render him totally disabled. 
Id. at 1325. More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The Commission, by adopting the findings of the medical panel as its own, failed to carry 
out its task. 
Thus, in like fashion, the Industrial Commission in this matter shunned its own responsibilities 
and deferred to the medical panel's conclusions as to disability, which were outside the "medical 
aspects" the medical panel is statutorily entitled to consider. 
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The Industrial Commission in this case also referred to the medical panel's determination 
of the possible rehabilitation of Mr. Smith. Such deferment is contrary to Utah law. As the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hardman pointed out: 
In order for an accurate assessment of his rehabilitation potential to be made, § 35-1-67 
requires the Commission to draw upon the expertise of the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. Once the employee has been referred there upon the Commission's 
tentative finding of permanent total disability, the burden is then upon the employee 
through his cooperation with the division to establish that he cannot be rehabilitated. 
Id. at 1327 (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court in Hardman concluded: 
The Administrative Law Judge's substitution of his judgment for the evaluation of the 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation was clearly error. Despite the findings of the 
medical panel and despite his own findings that plaintiff suffered from "continuous 
headaches, dizziness, [feeling] sick, and occasionally [passing] out," all symptoms that 
would diminish one's ability to perform almost any work, he still recommended that 
plaintiff look for "jobs such as a service station attendant [or] motel manager." It is not 
enough in such a case to allege that work is available; it must be shown that there is 
regular, dependable work available for the plaintiff, without the expectation that he will 
rely on the sympathy of friends or his own "super-human efforts." 
Id at 1327. In this case, just as in Hardman. the Commission has substituted its judgment, as 
well as the medical panel's judgment, for the evaluation of the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services. 
Not only was the Commission recalcitrant in avoiding its duty to make a determination as 
to whether a disability existed and whether rehabilitation was possible, the Commission's 
deferment to the medical panel on the issue of rehabilitation runs counter to this court's decision 
in Hoskings v. Industrial Comm.. 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In Hoskings. the 
Industrial Commission disallowed permanent total disability benefits. The Industrial 
Commission had before it a Division of Rehabilitation evaluation that the claimant was not 
susceptible to rehabilitation. The Commission also had before it a vocational evaluation which 
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had been performed by a private rehabilitation firm. In contrast to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services' evaluation, the private rehabilitation firm concluded that the claimant could be 
rehabilitated. Apparently, the Commission found the private rehabilitation firm's report to be 
more credible, and denied the claimant benefits based upon that report. This court reversed the 
Commission's conclusion on the basis that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 provided that the only 
body entitled to inquire into the issue of rehabilitation was the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services. This court concluded: 
As we read the statute, the Commission was unable to revisit the issue of rehabilitation or 
to consider other evidence, such as the [private rehabilitation firm's] report presented by 
Salt Lake City Corporation. 
Id. at 157. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Commission's conclusion in this matter that 
Robert Smith could be rehabilitated must be completely discounted by this court, first because it 
relies upon the medical panel which was not competent to make that conclusion, and second it 
can be argued that the Commission came to this conclusion itself, which conclusion the 
Commission itself is not in power to make under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67. 
This court should note that the Hoskings decision, much like the Hardman and Marshall 
decisions, supports an award of permanent total disability in this case. In Hoskings, the claimant 
injured his ankle in the course of his employment as a fireman in 1980. The claimant underwent 
surgery for the ankle condition, but continued to experience pain. Six years later, the claimant 
reinjured his left ankle in the course of employment. However, the claimant did not miss any 
time from work as a result of the second injury. After the second injury, the claimant 
experienced chronic pain and difficulty in walking. Conservative remedies were attempted, but 
significant improvement could not be achieved. 
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In 1988, the claimant retired to take advantage of an early retirement package. In the 
summers of 1990 and 1991, the claimant worked in jobs which consisted of driving a vehicle 
from one place to another, making inspections and teaching fire safety procedures. The claimant 
reported no difficulties in performing the duties of these subsequent jobs. In 1990, the claimant 
filed an application for, among other things, permanent total disability by reason of his ankle 
injury. The matter was referred to a medical panel, which found that the origin of the problem 
was industrial and that it had worsened since the second accident. Based upon the panel's 
finding, the ALJ made a tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred the matter to 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services. As previously stated, the matter was also referred to a 
private rehabilitation firm. 
Upon receiving all of the reports, including the Division of Rehabilitation Services 
evaluation that the claimant could not be rehabilitated, the ALJ in Hoskings applied the odd lot 
doctrine and found that the claimant had met his burden of proving that the second accident 
caused his ankle injury and that he could not return to work as a fire fighter. Next, the ALJ 
found that the claimant had met his burden in proving that he could not be rehabilitated. Lastly, 
the ALJ concluded that the claimant's employer had not met his burden to show regular, steady 
work was nonetheless available to the claimant. As a result of these findings, the ALJ held that 
the claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. 
The same findings could be found in the present matter. Applying the odd lot doctrine, 
Robert Smith has met his burden of proving that the May 23,1990, industrial accident caused the 
injury to his back. This is undisputed. Robert Smith has also proved that he could not return to 
his work which involved heavy labor. This is undisputed as well. In fact, the ALJ made a 
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specific finding that Robert Smith could not resume heavy lifting. (R. 102 at Tf 24). As 
previously stated, Robert Smith has been deprived of the possibility of proving that he could not 
be rehabilitated because the Industrial Commission refused to refer Mr. Smith to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. In any event, his employer did not meet its burden of showing regularly 
steady work was available which met Mr. Smith's capabilities. 
Just as in the Hoskings case, the employer in this case attempted by way of hearsay 
evidence to prove that Robert Smith could have received other employment. Recognizing 
hearsay problems here, the ALJ only conditionally allowed in records of alternative employment. 
(R. 232). However, to find that alternative employment was available to Robert Smith based 
upon hearsay alone, constitutes reversible error. The Hoskings court discussed the residuum 
rule, providing: 
However, the Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based exclusively on hearsay 
evidence."Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 
1984) (emphasis on original). To support the Commission's findings, "there must be a 
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a court of law." Hackford v. Industrial 
Commission. 11 Utah 2d 312, 315, 358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961)." 
Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 155. Accordingly, this court must conclude that the Commission had no 
basis to conclude that regular steady work was available to Mr. Smith. This fact is compounded 
by the medical panel's own finding that in his current condition, Mr. Smith could not even 
perform light duty work. (R. 76). 
In reality, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are inconsistent. In the first place, the 
Industrial Commission maintains that Mr. Smith has not shown that his disability is medically 
caused by the industrial accident. As a basis for this conclusion, the Industrial Commission 
states that Mr. Smith could be rehabilitated and was disabled due to factors other than the 
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industrial injury. However, to look at the rehabilitation possibilities related to Mr. Smith in a 
determination of whether he is disabled at all ignores Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and places the 
cart before the horse. Because the Industrial Commission concluded that medical causation had 
not been shown, the Industrial Commission seeks to avoid the necessity of submitting Mr. 
Smith's claim to the Division of Rehabilitation Services. However, if the Commission is intent 
on relying on possible rehabilitation for the denial of permanent total disability benefits, then the 
correct procedure should be followed in that medical causation should be admitted and the matter 
submitted to the Division of Rehabilitation Services as the legislature intended. 
In short, by deferring to the medical panel's determination which is outside the scope of 
"medical aspects", and by failing to seek an evaluation of the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, the Industrial Commission has acted contrary to law and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In reality, the present claim is hardly distinguishable from the Hardman and Marshall 
matters. When the Industrial Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment 
existed which was related to the industrial accident, and that Mr. Smith could not return to his 
prior employment of heavy lifting due to that permanent impairment, medical causation has been 
proven. Thus, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are not supported by the facts or the law. 
Instead, where it is found that an industrial injury makes up part of a disability, the claim should 
go forth through the sequential decision-making analysis, the Department of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, and the review of whether the odd lot doctrine is applicable. The law simply 
mandates this procedure and the Industrial Commission must therefore be reversed. The 
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applicant asks that this matter be remanded for a determination of the claim under a correct 
application of the law. 
DATED AND SIGNED this IT* day of October, 1996. 
DAVID N?MORTENSEN 
SHERLYNN W. FENSTERMAKER 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM ONE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ROBERT SMITH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
Case No. 91-644 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
MITY LITE; WORKERS COMPENSA- * 
TION FUND OF UTAH; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING^ 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES; 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 16, 
1994, at 3:00 o' clock p.m. The hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant, Robert Smith, was present and 
represented by Sherlynn Fenstermaker, Attorney at 
Law. 
The defendant employer, Mity Lite, and its insurer, 
the Workers Compensation Fund, were represented by 
Suzan Pixton, Attorney at Law, and the successor 
attorney is Carrie Taylor. 
The defendant, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, was 
represented by its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman, 
Attorney at Law. 
On May 20, 1994, the applicant submitted additional informa-
tion from Paul Stoneman, a physical therapist, and a report by Dr. 
James Adams. The applicant reported that Dr. Adams had been out of 
his office due to illness, and was back only on a part-time basis, 
and three additional weeks were requested to provide Dr. Adams' 
comments to the ALJ. The extension was granted until June 10, 
1994. 
On June 8, 1994, the applicant submitted the letter from Dr. 
Adams. On June 13, 1994, a response to that letter was received 
from the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. The case was then 
ready for some action to be taken. 
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On August 2, 1993, E. Craig McAllister, an attorney who 
previously represented the applicant filed a request for attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $3,288.20 for benefits generated to date, and 
a percent of future permanent partial disability benefits to be 
paid out of the applicant's award, pursuant to a contract alleged 
between McAllister and the applicant, and the rules of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (IC). 
Mr* McAllister alleged that he represented the applicant for 
almost two and one half years, or since February 1991. At that 
time he indicated that temporary total compensation had been 
terminated and that a compensation agreement was offered based on 
an insurance company medical examination by Dr. Nord. The 
applicant's treating physician allegedly recommended surgery, said 
that the applicant was not stable, and further said that temporary 
total compensation should be continued. 
An Application for Hearing was filed, and an Answer was 
received accepting liability for the recommended surgery and back 
temporary total compensation. Mr. McAllister alleged that after 
many months of additional effort on the applicant's behalf, the 
applicant was given temporary total compensation and a hearing was 
not required. 
Since then Mr. McAllister says that $16,441 of TTD has been 
paid from the period January 25, 1991 to February 14, 1993, when 
the benefits were terminated. He further alleges that the 
attorney's fees due on those benefits are $3,288.20. Mr. 
McAllister further alleges that he understands at least $1,846.50 
has been withheld from the applicant's benefits for attorney's 
fees, and he therefore requests that the $1,846.50 be remitted to 
him. This issue will not be resolved until a final order is issued 
in this case. 
The applicant is currently represented by Sherlynn W. 
Fenstermaker. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant, Robert Smith, is 37 years old, and has been 
receiving Social Security benefits since April 1991. He is 
classified as a younger individual. A document submitted by the 
applicant on June 27, 1994 shows that according to the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), Mr. Smith's sole disabling medical 
problem is a herniated disc with peridural adhesions, and that his 
disability began on May 23, 1990. 
2. He is entitled to temporary total disability compensation 
at a rate of $274.40 per week. 
JXB 
ROBERT SMITH 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
3. On the date of the industrial injury, May 23, 1990, the 
applicant was working for Mity Lite in a custodian position. He 
was attempting to lift a heavy pallet when he hurt his back. He 
has had three surgeries, nerve blocks, and cortisone treatments. 
He received some relief after his first surgery, but indicates that 
his back got "a lot worse." Since the surgery, he has felt "bad" 
which is interpreted to mean chronic pain. He has been receiving 
morphine sulfate every two to three hours which he says relieves 
approximately 50 percent of his pain. 
4. The applicant indicates that he can walk some, but he 
cannot sit. When he travels by car he has to lay down. He cannot 
walk around the block; he cannot sit - so he alternates lying down 
and standing. The applicant testified that his pain has been at 
the same level for several years. He says that each week it 
appears to get worse. 
5. He worked in general labor doing heavy lifting and digging 
ditches throughout most of his life. The highest grade he claims 
to have completed was the fifth grade. The SSA says that he 
completed the seventh grade. The applicant was forced to leave 
school because his mother became ill and died. He cannot write 
well; for example, he claims not to be able to fill out an 
employment application or to be able to balance his check book. 
His wife reads to him. He claims that he cannot do any kind of 
work. 
6. Most of the applicant's work has been in construction or 
other type of low income positions, such as mopping and waxing 
floors. 
7. A letter dated November 17, 1992, addressed "To Whom It 
May Concern" was sent to Mr. Smith. It indicates that Mity Lite 
would assist the recovering employee to return to work, even if it 
required a light duty position. Mity Lite indicated that three 
light duty positions would be available. One light janitorial 
position would be sweeping and emptying trash cans with a doctor's 
designation of the maximum weight when a trash can was full; 
another would be "leg capping" which would be attaching plastic leg 
caps on legs before they are attached to a table. This could be 
done in a sitting or standing position. The third would be as a 
bonding facilitator; this position would include filling one quart 
bottles with glue, cutting plastic strips into lengths, and no 
heavy lifting would be required. Mr. Smith denies receiving the 
letter or even knowing that the light duty positions were 
available. 
;,0S9 
ROBERT SMITH 
ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
8. Mr. Cole, who wrote the letter, indicated that the 
duration and intensity of any of these positions could be modified 
to ensure that the applicant would not aggravate his back injury. 
He would also be allowed to take small frequent breaks to relieve 
any work induced stress. 
9. Mr. Smith appeared at the hearing pushing a walker in 
front of him and groaning. He stood throughout the hearing, and 
audibly moaned on occasion. The hearing was recessed at one point 
to allow Mr. Smith to lie down. 
10. The medical films were received by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on October 18, 1994. The case was sent to the 
medical panel on that date. During review by the medical panel, 
the panel found that Mr. Smith had extensive involvement with Dr. 
Washburn although he denied having been to a pain clinic. On 
December 5, 1994, the medical panel requested that Mr. Smith supply 
records of his involvement with Dr. Washburn. 
11. The medical panel completed its report and filed it with 
the IC on May 30, 1995. It was mailed to the parties on May 30, 
1995 with instructions to reply not later than the close of 
business on June 14, 1995 with any objections. The applicant 
replied on June 19, 1995 with a request for clarification from the 
medical panel. The requested clarifications relate to minor 
alleged irregularities and would not have caused the medical panel 
to reach a different result. On June 22, 1995, the defendant 
responded to the request for clarification asking that the request 
be denied. 
12. The medical panel was composed of an orthopedist as 
member and a neurologist as chair. The panel had a psychiatrist to 
evaluate Mr. Smith. The panel concluded that Mr. Smiths current 
back problems stem from his low back industrial injury of May 23, 
1990 to the extent of approximately two-thirds of his current 
physical impairment related to his back. Although he claims to 
have been asymptomatic prior to the injury, there were definite 
significant radiologic degenerative changes present before the 
injury. 
13. He has a low back impairment related to his May 23, 1990 
injury of 8.7 percent of the whole person. He has additional whole 
person impairments of 4.3 percent related to the low back, seven 
percent related to the shoulders, and five percent related to his 
psychiatric status. These additional problems were found by the 
medical panel not to be related to the May 23, 1990 injury. 
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14. His treating physician gave Mr. Smith a 100 percent 
disability rating, but it was not done in accordance with the AMA 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th Edition as 
modified. It cannot therefore be considered since it provides very 
little objective information. 
15. Mr. Smith was temporarily and totally disabled subsequent 
to May 22, 1990 due to the industrial injury until October 1, 1992. 
16. The medical care which has been received by Mr. Smith for 
his back after May 22, 1990 has been related to the injury of May 
23, 1990. 
17. Future medical care related to the injury of May 23, 1990 
will likely include infrequent periodic orthopedic follow-up for 
counsel for reference to appropriate activities, weight control, 
exercise approaches, use of appropriate anti-inflammatory drugs, 
and safe pain relieving medications. Further surgery would not 
likely produce any additional benefit unless there ware some major 
unforeseen future events. A pain clinic may have merit, if 
prescribed, to get him weaned from the use of narcotics. Because 
of personality factors, the pain clinic should be strictly for a 
limited period of time. 
18. Mr. Smith is young, and should be able to manage light 
duty or sedentary activities once he becomes better conditioned. 
His most restrictive condition will be his back, and his shoulder 
limitation should not be a greater limitation than his back. 
19. Much of Mr. Smiths current inability to return to work 
stems from factors other than the results of the injury. He has a 
personality disorder according to both the psychiatrist on the 
medical panel (Dr. Burgoyne) and the psychiatrist (Dr. McCann) who 
performed the independent medical examination. The personality 
disorder preexisted his physical injury. Dr. Burgoyne agreed with 
the diagnoses of Dr. McCann. 
20. Mr. Smith has demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern 
of inconsistencies. A large portion of his disability is not 
caused by objective factors. He has a pattern of exaggerated 
physical complaints. 
21. Dr. Colledge as well as the psychiatrists found that Mr. 
Smith demonstrated somatoform pain complaints. His complaints are 
abundantly inconsistent which suggests to the doctors that his 
complaints are founded on nonanatomical and nonphysiological 
foundations. 
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22. Most of the doctors found that his opiate habit is 
excessive given the minimal objective findings and inconsistent 
pain behaviors. 
23. It is obvious that Mr. Smith sees himself as disabled. 
His psychological condition is perpetuated due to the possibility 
of financial gain through the workers' compensation system. This 
perpetuation is not secondary to the injury, but is related to 
social and psychological factors. His disability is secondary to 
conversion disorder which is not caused by the industrial injury of 
May 23, 1990. 
24. It would be appropriate for Mr. Smith to attend a pain 
clinic to reduce his need for opiates. It would then be 
appropriate for him to be worked with by the vocational 
rehabilitation people to assist him to be retrained for work 
commensurate with his physical capabilities. He will not be able 
to return to heavy lifting. The employer has shown a willingness 
to accommodate Mr. Smith although the positions which it offered 
were found not to be appropriate at this time until Mr. Smith is 
weaned from his narcotics, and is conditioned for light duty or 
sedentary work. 
25. The amount of fees claimed by Mr. McAllister must be 
reduced by $716.42 since the period of temporary and total 
disability has been found by the medical panel to be for a shorted 
period than is the period claimed by Mr. McAllister. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Robert Smith is not permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of his back injury of May 23, 1990 which occurred on the job 
while working for Mity Lite as required by U.C.A. Section 35-1-1 et 
sea. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of Robert Smith for 
permanent and totally disability compensation based upon his back 
injury of May 23, 1990 is denied because of insufficient evidence 
to a preponderance as required by U.C.A. Section 35-1-1 et seq. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Robert Smith temporary total 
compensation at the rate of $274 per week for 71 weeks for a total 
of $19, 454 for temporary total disability during the period May 
23, 1990 through October 1, 1992 less any workers' compensation 
already paid for this period. These benefits are accrued and shall 
be paid in a lump sum with interest of eight percent per annum 
commencing effective the date each payment became due. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah pay all medical expenses incurred as a 
result of the industrial accident, said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Robert Smith permanent partial 
disability of 8.7 percent of the whole person, or $237 per week for 
27.14 weeks, for a total of $6,432.18 less any amount already paid 
for permanent partial disability on this claim; said amount is 
accrued and is to be paid in a lump sum, plus interest at eight 
percent per annum commencing effective November 1, 1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to E. Craig McAllister, former 
attorney for the Applicant, the sum of $1,130.08, for services 
rendered in this matter. Said fees represent a percentage of the 
compensation generated, pursuant to Commission rule, have been 
withheld from temporary and total disability compensation paid to 
the applicant, and shall be remitted directly to Mr. McAllister's 
office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Sherlynn Fenstermaker, attorney 
for the Applicant, the sum of $547.19 plus 20 percent of the 
interest paid to Mr. Smith, for services rendered in this matter. 
Said fees represent a percentage of the compensation generated, 
pursuant to Commission rule, shall be deducted from the award to 
Mr. Smith, and shall be remitted directly to Ms. Fenstermaker's 
office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of 
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2). 
DATED THIS / / day of September 1995. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
° BSrijamin A. Sims 
/Administrative Law Judge 
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ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 91-0644 
Robert Smith asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review 
the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Mr. Smith's claim for 
permanent total disability compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is Mr. Smith entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the record in this matter, the Industrial Commission 
makes the following findings of fact: 
Mr. Smith is 45 years old and has a fifth grade education. He 
has worked as a laborer and custodian. He experienced no problems 
with his back until May 23, 1990. On that day, in the course of 
his employment as a custodian for Mity Lite, he injured his lower 
back while lifting a heavy pallet. 
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A few hours after his accident, Mr. Smith went to a hospital 
emergency room and was diagnosed with tenderness in the paraspinal 
muscles. X-rays taken at the time showed some facet degeneration 
and disc space narrowing at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels. 
Thereafter, Mr. Smith received continuing medical attention 
for his back. An MRI in July 1990 showed bulging discs at the L4-5 
level. His physicians attempted conservative non-surgical 
treatment. When that was unsuccessful, he underwent surgery for a 
herniated disc in 1991, followed by a second operation in May 1992 
and a third in August 1992. 
Since his last surgery*, Mr. Smith has reported continuing 
pain. He has taken various pain medications, including morphine 
sulfate, for the last several years. He has not worked since his 
industrial accident of May 23, 1990. 
Mr. Smith has been awarded social security disability benefits 
as of the date of his accident, based on a finding that he has been 
unable to work due to herniated disc with peridural adhesions. 
The ALJ appointed a medical panel to consider the medical 
issues of Mr. Smith's claim. The panel found Mr. Smith to be in 
generally good health, but suffering from a 13% whole person 
impairment of his low back, two-thirds of which is attributable to 
his industrial injury. He also suffers a 7% whole person 
impairment due to a non-industrial shoulder injury and a 5% whole 
person impairment based on his psychiatric status, including 
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder 
and depression. The panel noted that "much of Mr. Smith's 
inability to return to work stems from factors other than the 
results of the injury". The panel further noted that with better 
conditioning, Mr. Smith could return to light duty work. The 
Industrial Commission hereby adopts the medical panel's report. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides 
medical expenses and compensation to workers injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of their employment. To qualify 
for such benefits, the applicant must first establish that an 
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accident occurred. The applicant must then establish the existence 
of both legal causation and medical causation. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission et al.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
The parties concede that Mr. Smith was involved in an work 
related accident on May 23, 1990 and that Mr. Smith has met the 
requirement of legal causation. However, Mr. Smith must also 
establish medical causation. In Align, at page 27, the Utah 
Supreme Court defined the test for medical causation as follows: 
(Medical causation) requires that the claimant prove the 
disability is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related activity. . . 
In the event the claimant cannot show a medical causal 
connection, compensation should be denied. 
In this case, Mr. Smith claims that his accident of May 23, 
1990 rendered him permanently and totally disabled. He must 
therefore show that the accident is the medical cause of such 
disability. As the Court of Appeals stated in Zupon v. Industrial 
Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993): 
Proving medical causation between the industrial accident 
and the disability for which the claimant seeks 
compensation is a necessary component for recovery. 
See also Large v. Industrial Comm.. 758 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah App. 
1988); Ortiz v. Industrial Comm.. 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
In considering the issue of medical causation, the Industrial 
Commission notes that the medical panel has found "Mr. Smith to 
suffer from a 13% whole person impairment of his lower back, of 
which two-thirds is due to his industrial injury. The foregoing 
impairment is not inconsequential. However, the medical panel and 
other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent 
pattern of nonindustrial depression, somatoform pain disorder, 
opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression which are 
diagnosed as the cause of his inability to return to work. For 
example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial and non-
industrial impairments, the medical panel concluded that with 
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adequate conditioning, Mr. Smith can perform light duty work. As 
noted at page five of the ALJ's decision, "Mr. Smith has 
demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies. A 
large portion of his disability is not caused by objective factors. 
He has a pattern of exaggerated physical complaints." 
Having considered the medical and other evidence regarding the 
relationship between Mr. Smith's industrial accident and his now 
claimed permanent total disability, the Industrial Commission 
concludes that Mr. Smith has failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his industrial accident is the medical cause 
of his now claimed permanent total disability. 
Because medical causation is a prerequisite to an award of 
benefits, the Industrial Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that 
Mr. Smith's application for permanent total disability compensation 
must be denied. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the 
subsidiary elements of the "sequential decision making process" of 
§35-1-67 of the Act. 
QEDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's order and denies 
Mr. Smith's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this day of May, 1996. 
Commissioner 
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DISSENT 
According to the Industrial Commission's majority decision, 
the evidence in this case does not establish that Mr. Smith's 
industrial accident caused his permanent total disability. I 
disagree. 
The fact that Mr. Smith suffered an industrial accident on May 
23, 1990 is admitted. Before the accident, he worked and supported 
his family. After the accident, he underwent a series of back 
surgeries that have left him in pain and dependant on medications. 
Furthermore, he is now 45 years old, has only a fifth grade 
education and is functionally illiterate. In this day and age, it 
is practically impossible for Mr. Smith to compete with younger, 
stronger, healthier workers for the few unskilled light duty jobs 
he is theoretically qualified to perform. In my view, Mr. Smith's 
injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him 
permanently and total disabled. This opinion is supported by the 
fact that Mr. Smith has been awarded social security disability 
benefits for essentially the same injuries that are at issue in his 
workers' compensation case. 
I would reverse the decision of the ALJ and grant Mr. Smith 
the permanent total disability compensation to which he is entitled 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIOSTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 30 
days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT.TNO 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Robert W. Smith, Case No. 91-644 was 
mailed first class postage prepaid thisy^r day of May, 1996, to 
the following: 
Robert W. Smith 
345 East 200 South 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Sherlynn Fenstermaker 
Attorney at Law 
Ivie & Young 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Carrie T. Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
P. O Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929 
Erie Boorman, Administrator 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
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ADDENDUM THREE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 15 1996 
Robert Smith, 
Petitioner, 
V. ; 
Mity Lite and/or Workers ] 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
and the Employer's Reinsurance 
Fund and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, ] 
Respondent. 
) PETITION 
) Case No. 
COURT OF 
Marilyn M. Branch 
oierK OT tne uouii 
FOR WRIT OF REVIEW 
91-0644 
APPEALS # 960441-CA 
Petitioner petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a Writ of Review 
directed to the Respondent in this action, directing the Board of Review to 
prepare and transmit the record index in the above-referenced matter. 
Petitioner petitions for a Writ of Review and alleges that the 
decision of the Board of Review is in error for the following specific 
reasons: 
(NOTE: Failure to state the specific reasons for your appeal 
may result in denial of the petition by the Court.) 
(see attached) 
(ALSO NOTE: Failure to submit a Docketing Statement within 21 
days from the date of filing this petition may result in dismissal 
of appeal.) 
Dated this 12th day of July, 1996. 
/s/Sherlynn White Fenstermaker 
David N. Mortensen 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
UKIbllNML 
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SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER, 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
#1057 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ROBERT SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW 
vs. : 
MITY LITE and/or WORKERS : 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
and THE EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE: 
FUND and THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 91-0644 
%DHMi'6^1 
Petitioner, Robert Smith, by and through his counsel 
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals 
for a Writ of Review directing the respondent Industrial Commission 
of Utah to certify its entire record, which shall include all the 
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter to this court. 
- •< J+3\ 0 
This petition seeks to review the entire Order of the 
Industrial Commission denying petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration dated June 10, 1996 as well as the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order of the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge dated September 11, 1995, copies of which 
are hereto attached. 
DATED AND SIGNED this (f~ day of July, 1996. 
SHERLYNN W. FENSTEI 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Review with postage prepaid 
thereon this ?S day of July, 1996, to the following: 
Industrial Commission 
160 East 3 00 South, 3rd Floor 
PO BOX 146615 
SLC UT 84114-6615 
Richard Sumsion 
Workers Compensation 
PO BOX 57929 
SLC UT 84157-0929 
Erie Boorman 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
PO BOX 146611 
SLC UT 84114-6611 
sjnith-4.ml0 
Paraleqal 
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ADDENDUM FOUR 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability cased by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this 
chapter requires a finding by the Commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of 
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The Commission shall adopt rules that conform to 
the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus 
$5 for a dependant spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under 
Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent 
total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its 
insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, 
in excess of the amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation 
shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance 
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 
312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extend allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the 
same period. 
(5) A finding by the Commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be 
tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally 
disabled, the Commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the 
employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for 
rehabilitation training, the Commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for the Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use int he 
rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education 
certifies to the Commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that 
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the 
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the Commission shall, after notice to the parties, 
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the Commission shall order 
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The 
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by the Commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends 
with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, 
steady work. In any case, where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's 
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under 
this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both 
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of 
permanent total disability si required in any such instance. 
R490-1-17. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total 
disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social 
Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use 
of the term "substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some 
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative to 
permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the 
requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases 
be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in 
the process of making, a determination of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission 
may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf. 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social 
Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of he disability 
is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes. 
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission shall rely 
upon and be guided by the rules of disability determination published by the Social Security 
Administration Office of Disability publication SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended. In short, the 
sequential decision-making process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to 
be made in sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically sever impairment? 
3. Does the sever impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of SSA 
Pub. No. 64-014? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous work? 
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant shall be referred to 
the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work 
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial 
accident, there shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing. 
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the Commission shall issue an 
order finding or denying permanent total disability based upon the preponderance of the evidence 
and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the residual functional 
capacity as detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014. 
